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ABSTRACT
This research describes the development of an experimental radiation testing
environment to investigate the single event effect (SEE) susceptibility of the 486-DX4
microprocessor. SEE effects are caused by radiation particles that disrupt the logic state
of an operating semiconductor, and include single event upsets (SEU) and single event
latchup (SEL).
The relevance of this work can be applied directly to digital devices that are used in
spaceflight computer systems. The 486°DX4 is a powerful commercial microprocessor
that is currently under consideration for use in several spaceflight systems. As part of its
selection process, it must be rigorously tested to determine its overall reliability in the
space environment, including its radiation susceptibility.
The goal of this research is to experimentally test and characterize the single event
effects of the 486-DX4 microprocessor using a cyclotron facility as the fault-injection
source. The test philosophy is to focus on the "operational susceptibility," by executing
real software and monitoring for errors while the device is under irradiation. This
research encompasses both experimental and analytical techniques, and yields a
characterization of the 486-DX4's behavior for different operating modes. Additionally,
the test methodology can accommodate a wide range of digital devices, such as
microprocessors, microcontrollers, ASICS, and memory modules, for future testing.
The goals were achieved by testing with three heavy-ion species to provide different
linear energy transfer rates, and a total of six microprocessor parts were tested from two
different vendors. A consistent set of error modes were identified that indicate the
manner in which the errors were detected in the processor. The upset cross-section
curves were calculated for each error mode, and the SEU threshold and saturation levels
were identified for each processor. Results show a distinct difference in the upset rate
for different configurations of the on-chip cache, as well as proving that one vendor is
supedor to the other in terms of latchup susceptibility. Results from this testing were also
used to provide a mean-time-between-failure estimate of the 486-DX4 operating in the
radiation environment for the International Space Station.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
As our space agency's budget continues to downsize, NASA is using more and more commercial, off-the-
shelf technology to carry out its scientific missions & objectives. The 486-DX4 microprocessor is one of
those commercial devices chosen for use in several spaceflight computer systems, including at least one
used onboard the Space Shuttle. The Payload & General Support Computer (PGSC) is a laptop PC
computer that astronauts use during Space Shuttle flights. It is a 486-DX4-based system that is primarily
used for non-critical mission functions such as data collection, environmental control & observation, and
personal management. However, in order to use the PGSC to a greater extent, such as to control the
Orbiter's functions, its reliability must be accurately evaluated and predicted for critical spaceflight
operations. This includes ground-based radiation testing of the PGSC's components, especially the
microprocessor.
To this date, the only known radiation database for the 486-DX4 consists of total dose testing. SEU test
data exists for the DX2, but not for the DX4; thus the premise for this research was to investigate the SEU
susceptibility of the 486-DX4 microprocessor using a cyclotron facility. The results from this experimental
testing can then be used to help determine the overall performance and reliability of any 486-based
computer, including the PGSC, in a space radiation environment.
2.0 TEST PHILOSOPHY & OBJECTIVES
In the past, much of the SEU testing efforts have focused solely at the device level, with an emphasis on
register-level or bit-level susceptibility. The approach in this research however, was to concentrate on the
"operational susceptibility" of the device. The premise is that many potential error states induced by SEU
may not be detected by register-level testing alone [8]. An observed error may be the result of multiple
upsets that have manifested in separate locations or circuits. While their individual effects alone may not
cause an error, their combined efforts may trigger an observable functional error. The 486-DX4 is a very
complex microprocessor with many interleaved operations occurring during each clock cycle, therefore the
interaction of multiple SEU errors presents important control-flow issues to consider. While this method
may not give as much insight as to where something happened, it will give a good estimate of the
operational upset rate for the microprocessor as a whole.
"lhis approach then, requires the device to be tested in a manner that is consistent with the actual
application environment in which it is to be used. Our philosophy was to test the processor in an
operational state while executing real code at the device's rated speed. For the 486-DX4 testing, this
included using a PC-based system board with all associated peripherals to host the processor, albeit only
2the processor was exposed to the radiation beam. This method allows the CPU (or any other system
component) to be tested in an integrated fashion, just as it would be configured for operation in its intended
environment. This standardized setup was developed to accommodate a wide range of digital devices, such
as memory modules or ASICS, for future testing. This research did not try to identify or improve weak
areas of the chip design, instead it measured its performance and susceptibility in a heavy-ion environment.
486-DX4 SEU Test Goals
The primary goal of this research was to develop an evaluation platform to experimentally measure the
SEU and SEL susceptibility of the 486-DX4 microprocessor. Specifically, the following objectives were
sought:
(1) To perform the 486-DX4 test with 3 different heavy-ion species;
• Xenon (LET = 43.1 MeV-cm2/mg)
• Krypton (LET = 25.1 MeV-cm2/mg)
• Argon (LET = 7.7 MeV-cm2/mg)
(2) Identify the observable error modes in the microprocessor
(3) Calculate the upset cross-sections of the device using the error modes, fluence, and error rate
(4) Compare the upset rate for different operating configurations of the device,
specifically with the internal Ll-cache enabled vs. disabled
(5) Determine the SEU and SEL threshold levels
(6) Test different chip implementations of the 486-DX4 using parts from two
different vendors: Intel Corporation and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)
(7) Use these test results to predict the reliability of the 486-DX4 in the radiation
environment associated with the International Space Station orbit
33.0 THE 486-DX4 MICROPROCESSOR
The 486-DX4 is a widely used 32-bit microprocessor that has an extensive software base and is utilized on
a wide variety of platforms. The device's popularity is due to its advanced design, low power
requirements, low cost, mass production, and strong compatibility with different PC systems. It is also
binary compatible with all previous versions of the 80x86 processor family, thus any 80x86 software can
be supported by the 486-DX4.
The DX4 contains a 32-bit pipelined integer arithmetic logic unit (ALU), as well as an on-chip floating
point unit. The insa-uction set microarchitecture is implemented using RISC design techniques such that
frequently-used instructions are executed in one clock cycle. The DX4 supports a segmented addressing
scheme which includes byte-level addressing. Code and data for each task are stored and managed in
"segments" which can be up to four gigabytes (272 bytes) in size. Each task can have a maximum of
16,381 segments, thus each task can address a maximum of 64 terabytes (trillion bytes) of virtual memory.
The memory management unit consists of a segmentation unit and a paging unit. The segmentation unit
allows management of the logical address space by keeping code and data for each task organized in certain
portions of memory. The segmentation unit also implements a four-level protection scheme on all data
structures. The paging unit provides access to data structures larger than the available physical memory by
swapping the current data into memory and retaining the unused part in mass storage.
The 486-DX4 has an internal Ll-cache that is used to hold instructions and data of a currently executing
program inside the processor, thus saving time and speeding up memory operations by an order of
magnitude. It is a 4-way set associative cache that supports a write-ttmaugh policy. The DX4 also
contains built-in self-test circuitry, test registers, and a debug mode to aid programmers and system
designers in software development. A functional block diagram of the 486-DX4 microprocessor is given in
Fig. 1.
The 486-DX4 has four modes of operation that determine which instructions and processor features are
accessible, and are called: (1) Real Mode, (2) Protected Mode, (3) Virtual 8086 Mode, and (4) System
Management Mode. In Real Mode the processor acts as a fast 8086 and it is normally used to set up the
processor for protected mode operation. The ProWled Mode allows execution of all the 32-bit instructions
and sophisticated privileges of the 486-DX4, as well as use of the memory management paging. The
Virtual 8086 Mode is a sub-mode of the protected mode, allowing the execution of multiple 8086 tasks
within the bounds of the protected, multitasking environment of the processor. Finally, the System
Management Mode is used by system designers to add new software-controlled features to the system.
The application register set of the 486-DX4 is a group of sixteen registers that may be used by the
programmer to support program execution, and are grouped into three categories: (I) General registers,
(2) Segment registers, and (3) Status & Control registers. The 32-bit General registers are used to hold
operands and results for logical and arithmetic operations, as well as operands for address calculations.
They are byte-accessible to provide flexibility for the programmer and to remain compatible with earlier
80x86 families, The 16-bit Segment registers are used to support the memory organization of the
processor, and contain values which index into tables in memory. They are used to keep track of where the
data, code, and stack is of each process. The Status & Control registers hold the results and condition
codes of each instruction, as well as control certain operations and indicate the status of the processor. The
application register set of the 486-DX4 is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: The Application Register Set of the 486-DX4, where the shaded regions represent
those registers directly testing in the SEU experiment (see section 5.2).
One important aspect of this SEU experiment is to test the susceptibility, or "radiation hardness," of the
application register set. This was achieved by loading them with test patterns and checking to see if and
when they change under the influence of radiation. The shaded areas in Fig. 2 indicate the registers directly
tested in the SEU experiment, giving a test coverage of 76.9% of the entire set. Some registers could not be
directly tested due to the fact that they were needed to control the test program execution, such as the
instruction pointer (EIP), but they were always indirectly tested by observing errors in the program flow.
The details of this algorithm will be discussed in the Test Software section.
When the Ll-cache was disabled all memory references have to go off-chip to the system DRAM, thereby
reducing system performance. During the radiation test, the processor was tested in both cache
configurations, and it was expected that higher upset rates would occur when the Ll-cache is enabled. This
is due to the fact that when instructions and data are held in the cache they are vulnerable to being upset,
even before they are executed. With the cache disabled, all code and data reside in system DRAM and are
thus protected from radiation.
While both AMD and lntel have produced pin-to-pin equivalent DX4 designs, there are several major
differences between them. Intel's design possess 16KB of internal Ll-cache (code & data), while AMD's
design contains 8KB. The biggest difference between the two is in the fabrication process and die size.
lnte)'s DX4 design is fabricated on a 3.3 volt 0.6 micron BiCMOS process, contains 1.8 minion
6transistors, and the die is approximately 0.7225 cm 2. AMD's design is produced on a 0.5 micron 3LM
CMOS process, contains about 1.6 million transistors, and is approximately 0.49 cm". The 486-DX4 is
available in either a 168-pin Pin Grid Array (PGA) ceramic package, or a 208-pin Plastic Quad Flatpack
(PQF). The devices used in this testing were of the PGA type. The process feature differences (that could
be obtained) for each vendor are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1" 486-DX4 Device and Process Characteristics.
Characteristic
| i
lab process
Operating voltage
Transistor count 1.8M
Die size 0:7225 cm 2
Package type
lntel
0.6 gin BiCMOS
3.3 Volts
Well type
,i
168-pin PGA
AMD
0.5 lain 3LM CMOS
3.45v01t 
1.6M
0.4900 cm 2
168-pin PGA
Internal Ll-cache 16KB
Waf_ type P-EPI on P n/a
n/adual wen
80 Angstroms
3.1 ILm
Gate Oxide thickness
Min feature size 0.57 lun
Min channel length 0,30 Izm
Di sion 'n/a
Passivation thickness 4500 Angstroms
Die overcoat material Polyimi_
Die overcoat thickness
100 Angstroms
n/a
n/a
4-layer/0.5 gm
n/a
n/a
_a
4.0' DESCRIPTION OF THE TEST ENVIRONMENT
The radiation testing was performed in the Single Event Effects Facili_, at the Texas A&M Cyclotron
Institute in College Station, Texas. Their K500 superconducting cyclotron was used to provide the heavy-
ion radiation source needed for SEU testing. The K500 is a physically compact, low energy consumption,
high energy machine capable of generating a diverse range of particles and energies to support many
different atomic and nuclear physics experiments [21 ]. For the TAMU cyclotron, seven beam lines exist
including the Single Event Effects line.
The SEE Line
As the radiation beam is sent down to the SEE Line, magnets help control, direct, and shape the beam to
help provide for uniformity and to reduce attenuation. The beam enters a test chamber where the target
device will be exposed to radiation. A shutter at the chamber entrance gives the experimenter precise
control over the application of the beam to the test system. The SEE Line consists of the following
components:
(1) Target chamber
(2) Positioning mechanism
(3) Imaging system
(4) Test Control and Monitoring Station
(5) Radiation safety
(6) User systems
The target chamber is a large aluminum enclosure with inside dimensions of 30 inches diameter by 30
inches high. In the middle of the chamber is a mounting bracket where the test system is attached. The
experimenter has real-time control over the X, Y, and Z axes,/>]us angular control in reference to the beam
arrival. The electrical interface to the test chamber is via a block of six 50-pin male IDC connectors.
The test chamber must be closed and in a vacuum during any radiation testing. Two mechanical fore
pumps and one turbomolecular pump are used to bring the chamber down to an operating pressure in the
low 10"s torr range. De-pressurization can take as little as 15 minutes (depending on the test system), and
venting takes about three minutes.
Once the test system is installed, a position check is made to ensure the target is in the center of the
beamline. This is achieved by coupling a high brightness phosphor to a sensitive CCD camera, as well as
using a laser for visual confirmation of the beam's center.
The experiment is controlled and monitored from the Test Control Station (TCS), located approximately 2
meters from the test chamber, separated by a thick lead shielding wall. All user equipment and personnel
are stationed at the TCS during testing. Instrumentation for the SEE Line is also performed at the TCS,
and includes the positioning and imaging systems, beam integrity monitoring, and operation of the beam
shutter.
Beam diagnostics are performed during testing which give the experimenter an accurate count of the beam
uniformity and flux. A faraday cup in the SEE Line provides the first measurement of the total beam
intensity, and continuous real-time monitoring of the particle beam is provided by an array of four plastic
scintillator and photomultipller tube (PMT) assemblies. These are arranged on a three inch diameter circle
8around the beam axis. A fifth PMT assembly is mounted on a moveable arm that allows it to be placed on
the beam axis [21]. Closer to the test chamber is a silicon surface barrier detector mounted on a movable
arm. This detector measures the total energy of the particle beam and thus provides information on beam
purity.
Ion Beam Selection
It is up to the experimenter to select the heavy-ions to be used in the cyclotron test. The most important
beam parameters to consider are the linear energy transfer (LET), range in silicon, and ion charge state.
For the first beam that was used, it was desired to test the processor in its saturated upset rate, thus Xenon
(Xo) was selected with an LET = 43.7 MeV--cm2/mg. The second beam selected was Krypton (Kr), to
provide intermediate data points 0..ET = 25.1 MeV-cm2/mg). The third beam was used to try and capture
the device's upset threshold, thus Argon (Ar), with an LET = 7.7 MeV-cm"/mg was used. A conservative
measure was used in selecting this beam, so that its LET was slightly higher than the actual expected
threshold. This was to ensure that the threshold was not missed altogether by undershooting and producing
no data points at all. Currently, eleven particle beams are available for SEE testing at the TAMU facility,
and are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Ion beams qualified for SEE Testing at the TAMU Cyclotron Facility [21 ].
The shaded entries comprised the beams used in the 486-DX4 experiment.
TAMU CYCLOTRON - HEAVY-ION BEAMS AVAILABLE FOR SEE TESTING
Ion
12 C 2+
16 0 3+
20 Ne 4+
Q/A
0.167
0.188
0.200
Energy
(MeV)
125
210
E/A
(MeV/A)
10.4
13.2
LET
(MeV-cm2/mg)
1.3
1.9
Range
tvm)
250.9
307.0
LETm_
5.3
7.4
298 14.9 12.5 315.9 9.6
Penetration
LETm_
246.2
302.0
308.4
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::i _ i ii_ i:;:i:i::_:!!i:i:i:,_i|ii_ii:,!:!:;:i::_!i!_i!ii:,!:,_:,_:,i:ii_i:, i_! !!| _?_i::_i!i!_iiii_!!!_!!:::: :::ii:ii:: i: ii;(: A: :::,!; :i_ i! i :_::i i' :_i:i:i:_i:_ i:il ::: _ : : : _i _i: ::ii
63 Cu 13+ 0.207 1003 16.0 17.2 185.8 33.9 169.6
..... !_ ................................ _ ....................................................::::::,,,,_N_:::,,,::,::_::l_::_N_iil;iiiiiiiii?i:!:N!ii ii:iiiiii!iiiiil$-31!?ii',',i',',ii:_iii',',:,i','/,ii_/:Nail:: ',_//:',i_;_fiiii
S4Kr _ 0.191 1141 13.6 26.6 136.0 41.3 114.8
_Kr _+ 0.179 1002 12.0 28.2 128.9 41.3 107.7
9_ Nb =_" 0.172 1030 11.1 34.5 120.0 47.9 95.8
197 ALl 33+ 0.168 2068 10.5 87.1 105.6 93.4 52.5
95.0 TEST PROCEDURES
5.1 Hardware Configuration
A commercial, off-the-shelf PC computer system was chosen and modified to host the test. The PC
motherboard was extracted and attached to a bracket that fit the inside dimensions of the test chamber. The
motherboard & test processors were the only hardware inside the test chamber, with the remaining
hardware residing at the Test Control Station. Interface cables 2.8 meters in length were required to
connect the motherboard to the rest of the system. These cables interfaced to the test chamber through the
block of 50-p|n IDC connectors.
The hardware at the Test Control Station included a digital logic analyzer, two power supplies, a hard disk
drive, video monitor, keyboard, and a temperature monitor. An illustration of the hardware setup is given
in Fig. 3, and a brief description of the required modifications are presented in the following subsections.
De-ridding the Test Processors
For each test device, the metal lid of the PGA package had to be removed in order to allow sufficient
energy to be deposited onto the silicon die. The de-lidding was a fairly trivial but delicate task, and was
achieved by using a hefty Exacto knife and several razor blades to cut away at the solder that secures each
lid. When the heel of the blade could be slid under a comer of the lid, pressure was used to pry it away.
The lids were then carefully taped back in place to protect the die until the experiment, and a thorough
functional check-out was performed to ensure no damage occurred in the removal process.
Desiizn of the CPU Extender Socket
The PGA package presented a problem since the lid to the die was also on the same side as the pins. Thus,
when the processor was plugged into its socket, the lid was "sandwiched" between the CPU and the
motherboa_ Since the only way to expose the die was through this lid, provisions had to he taken to alter
the orientation of the processor to provide a direct path for the beam.
A CPU extender socket was designed and built so that it flipped the processor 180 °. This was achieved by
soldering together two 168-pin PGA sockets with 30-guage wire. One of these sockets plugged into the
motherboard socket and the other was a zero-insertion force (ZIF) socket that the CPU plugged directly
into. The length of the connecting wires was kept as short as possible, approximately 14.5 cm each. This
approach was successful and allowed the processor to boot-up normally, however the processor's clock
speed had to be reduced from 100-MHz down to 75-MHz to run correctly. The increased signal lengths on
the CPU bus had introduced timing delays that could only be corrected by slowing down the bus speed.
Refer to Fig. 4 for a picture of the CPU extender socket, as well as the heat sink hardware that is described
in the subsection below.
CPU Thermal Management
One important parameter that had to be monitored during the experiment was the temperature of the
processor. The first sign of overheating would be in the form of data errors, thus steps were needed to
eliminate this threat. With conduction as the only means of removing heat, a 14" x 4" x 0.75" inch
aluminum plate was used to provide a massive heat sink. This plate was attached to the test bracket, which
was then attached to the top of each test processor with a thermal adhesive pad. A small hole was drilled
into the center of this plate where a thermocouple was inserted to allow contact with the top of the
processor. The thermocouple wire was routed outside the chamber to the Test Control Station, where
10
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it was connected to a Wavetek multimeter. The maximum operating temperature limit for the 486-DX4
was 85* Celsius (measured on the package surface), as defined by the data book. If a device was ever to
violate this limit, the system would be powered down and allowed to cool before resuming the test.
However, throughout all tests, the maximum temperature observed was only 63° Celsius.
Power Supplies
Two separate power supplies were needed for the cyclotron experiment. The goal was to isolate the CPU
power from the rest of the system, in order to monitor its power consumption for detecting latchup
conditions. The motherboard requires voltages of_12V, +_5V, and the CPU requires +3.3V which it
receives by stepping-down the +5V source via onboard voltage regulators.
The PC system power supply was used to drive the +12 and -5 voltages to the motherboard, as well as the
hard disk and floppy disk drives. A separate, current-limiting DC power supply was used to independently
drive the +5V voltages to the motherboard. By monitoring the +5V motherboard source, we could
indirectly monitor the CPU current draw, since any significant change in the CPU current would be
positively reflected at the power supply. The nominal current draw using AMD's CPU was 2100mA,
and with Intel's CPU it was 2360mA. The current limit was set at the nominal operating value plus
100mA. If this limit was ever breached, the power supply would enter a constant-current mode, where the
supply voltage would drop proportionally to maintain the current limit.
During the cyclotron experiment, a latchup condition would be detected by a sudden increase in the supply
current (due to the "virtual short"), and the current-limiting feature would help protect the device from
permanent latchup damage. The most accurate means of detecting latchup, however, would be to monitor
the current draw at the Vcc and Vss pins on the CPU. But there are 51 power pins on the 486-DX4, and
due to cabling constraints this option was not pursued.
Logic Analyzer Interface
A Hewlett-Packard 16500B digital logic analyzer was used in the experiment to acquire CPU data for post-
test analysis. The lower 16-bits of the processor's data bus were connected to the analyzer's signal pods,
and these were then routed to the logic analyzer at the Test Control Station. The logic analyzer pod cable
had to be modified to reach the inside of the test chamber. An HP extender cable was used to increase its
length, and two short (5 cm) adapters had to be built to connect the liP cables to the IDC connectors on the
chamber interface. The goal was to use the analyzer to store the contents of a corrupted register when an
SEU was detected. This data was then stored on the analyzer's hard drive, where it would be processed
off-line to determine which particular bit(s) of the register were hit. The purpose of using the logic
analyzer was to explore the effect of radiation on the control-flow issues of the processor. For details of
the logic analyzer's triggering mechanism, please see the discussion in the Test Software section.
Hard Disk Drive
A 560MB hard disk drive (HDD) was used to boot the system, load the test code, and record the data fries.
The HDD was attached to the outside of the test chamber via a 50-pin IDC connector. The cable length
was 114 era, and no delay or timing problems were observed. A similar cable was built for the floppy disk
drive, to provide file transfer capability and to serve as an emergency backup in case the HDD failed.
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Monitor Keyboard
A video monitor and keyboard were required during the experiment, and were connected to the system by
extension cables that were modified with 50-pin IDC connectors. These cables were 2.8 meters in length.
5.2 Software Requirements
The purpose of the test software was to dynamically exercise the 486-DX4 in a variety of ways to get a
broad response of the device under the influence of radiation. A suite of test programs were chosen to
provide aifferent workloads and instruction mixes that exercised different functional aspects of the device.
The software also provided a means to test the processor in different operating configurations, such as
enabling or disabling the internal L 1-cache.
Three types of programs were used in the SEU experiment, that comprised a total of eleven individual
programs. The first program type, called REG'W_.3T, tested the application register set (refer to section
3.0) of the 486-DX4 by loading the registers with one of four test patterns and then continuously checked
them for errors. The second program type, ALU'IE_T, performed a series of ALU-intensive operations
and wrote the results to a file for off-line analysis. The third program type, MCPDIAG, tested the floating-
point unit and reported the errors in real-time. While each program type attempted to focus on one
functional unit of the device, the entire processor was always vulnerable to upsets. All programs were
written in assembly language, with the exception of the MCPDIAG program, which was obtained from
Intel.
The REGTEST Program
The goal of the REGTEST program was to directly test the application register set of the 486-DX4 for
SEU upsets. REGTEST had eight different versions; four to he used when the internal Ll-cache was
enabled and four for when it was disabled. The only difference between these two groups is in a loop delay
constant, which was decreased when the cache was disabled to keep the loop overhead and time durations
the same. The programs within each group were logically the same except for the test pattern used to fall
the registers, either an SPFFF, $0000, $1010, or $0101.
When a REGTEST program was executed, the registers EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, EBP, EDI, ESI, ES, FS,
and GS were loaded with one of the four test patterns before the device was exposed to the beam. After the
initialization and loop overhead was performed, the program entered an endless loop where each register
was continuously compared to the test pattern. If at any time a mismatch was detected in a register, a call
would be made to an error-handiing routine. The first action in this routine was to display a "Halt Beam,
Error in Register...." message, at which time the experimenter would shut off the beam. The next step for
the error-handling routine was to re-compare the suspect register again to make sure the error was still
present. If not, the error was assumed to be transient and the routine ends by displaying a "Prepare to
Resume Beam .... "message. The experimenter then turns the beam back on and the program resumes
checking all the registers for upsets again.
However, if the re-compare still did not agree with the test pattern, the error had latched and an SEU had
occurred, The error-handling routine then compared each byte of the 32-bit register to determine which
byte was corrupted. This information was then displayed on the experimenter's video monitor and was
recorded in the data log. The next step was to determine ifSEL had occurred by attempting to write the
correct test pattern back to the register and immediately read it back again. If SEL had occurred, the
corrupted location would still remain latched and the correct pattern could not be written. If SEL occurred,
it would be logged and the power to the system would be recycled to clear the latch and a new test would
then be started. If the correct test pattern was written and read back successfully, thus only an SEU
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occurred, the error-handling routine would end by displaying the "Prepare to Resume Beam .... "message
and the ion beam would be turned on and the program would resume checking all registers again.
This endless loop would continue until either an SEU interrupted the program-flow, or the experimenter
terminated the program. The test program spent the majority of its execution time in this compare loop.
Flowcharts for the REGTEST algorithm are given in Figs. 5 and 6, and the source code may be found in
Appendix C.
Inltlallze System & [configure for test
Load Registers w/patterns:SFF, $00, SAA, $55
I Compare loopto chock registers(irradiation continues)
error detected
Halt beam
I Error-handllng routine I
Log failure type,
configuration, fluence
operation, beam
,1
Resume beam
error recovery
Figure 5: The flowchart for the REGTEST program.
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I request beamhalt
yes
repOrtmsgSEU I
compare each
byte to pattern
yes
I write correct ltest pattern
read back
same byte(s)
[_ report SEL
m_l
done
repOrtmsgTRANS I
request beam Jstart
I '
Figure 6: The error-handling routine for the REGTEST program.
As stated back in the Hardware Configuration section, the purpose of the logic analyzer was to determine
the corrupted bit locations of an upset register, and it was used in conjunction with the REGTEST
program. When an SEU was deteaed, the error-handling routine was invoked as described above. When it
was determined that an SEU had ocCtLrred, the routine would send out a "trigger signal" to the logic
analyzer, by writing a specific data flag to a memory location. This value would be sent out over the data
pins which the analyzer was sampling. Immediately after sending this trigger, the routine would then send
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thecontentsof thecorruptedregistertothesamememory location. When the analyzer saw the trigger, it
would begin storing state information off the data pins, thus capturing the trigger and the corrupted
register. The memory depth of the analyzer was IMB, and after it was full the data was saved to disk for
post-test analysis. Since the beam was off during the error-handling routine, there were no hard time
constraints that had to be obeyed. Thus the experimenter would command the logic analyzer to start
looking for this trigger once inside the routine, and the analyzer did not have to be synchronized with the
test software. It is important to note that this method could only be used with confidence when the L1-
cache was disabled. This is because the data flag's memory location could be assured of residing in system
DRAM (as opposed to onboard the chip's cache), and thus be picked offthe CPU's pins by the analyzer at
the correct time.
The ALUTEST Proeram
The arithmetic logic unit (ALU) and the input/output (I/O) functional units of the 486-DX4 were exercised
with the ALU'I_ST test program. This program was written in assembly language and its purpose was to
repeat a series of ALU-intensive operations and write the results to a file for post-test analysis. The ALU
operations performed were integer ADD, SUB, MULTIPLY, and DIVIDE. The program began by first
opening an output data file and then emering a loop that continuously repeated the series of four integer
operations. Each operation started with an initial value that was recursively manipulated for a set number
of operations. The results were written to the output file so the answers could be checked for errors post-
test. This test lasted for approximately 18 seconds, at which time the output file was closed and the
program terminated normally.
There were two versions of this program, one for each configuration of the Ll-cache. The two versions
were identical except for the program variable COUNTMAXl which corresponded to the total number of
iterations to execute before terminating the program. This difference was again to keep the execution times
equal under both conditions, thus COUNTMAX = 288 when L1 was enabled, and COUNTMAX = 40
when LI was disabled. The flowchart for the ALUTEST program is given in Fig. 7, and the source code
may be found in Appendix C.
The MCPDIAG Program
The floating-point unit (FPU) was tested with a program called MCPDIAG, which was acquired from the
Intel Corporation. This program is a bum-in test program they use for testing the FPUs of new chips.
When executed, it fast verifies that the processor is installed correctly and has a working FPU. Then it
continuously repeats a series of tests that check for proper FPU operation. After each iteration, the result
of the test is displayed as either "'Passed'' or "Failed." The user can stop the test at any time, at which
point a summary of all tests is then displayed. In Fig. 8, the flowchart for the MCPDIAG test program is
given. With this program, the data obtained wiU reflect the susceptibility of the floating-point unit
hardware to single event upsets.
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Figure 7: Flowchart for the ALUTESTprogram.
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Flowchart for the MCPDIAG floating-point unit test program.
5.3 Test Plan
This section reviews the procedures used dttnng the cyclotron tesL The fast action was to install the
system board in the test chamber, set up the monitoring equipment at the Test Control Station, and install
the interface cables. Next, the extender socket was attached to the system board. An operational checkout
of the system was then made, by booting up and executing a few test programs. When the checkout was
completed the test chamber was closed and de-pressurized. The vacuum pumps were turned on and in
about fifteen minutes the operational pressure of 10"s ton" was achieved.
Before the first test could commence, the beam had to be calibrated and fine-tuned. This was achieved by
the cyclotron personnel at the TCS. When it was determined the beam was within specifications, the
experiment could begin.
The first test program to be used was loaded off the hard disk. The program execution was started before
the ion beam was applied; since the software did not have to be synchronized with the beam it was easier to
monitor the test if the program was already running in an operational mode before beam application.
The monitoring and detection took place by watching the video screen for proper program flow or
erroneous program output, as well as monitoring the power supply current for signs of latchup. The test
program stopped when it either normally terminated, was stopped by the experimenter, or when an error
was detected.
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Upon error detection, the first action was to halt the beam at the TICS. Depending on the program, error
handling routines were activated, and the error information was entered into the test log. At the end of each
test run or whenever an error was detected, the beam was stopped and a count of the particle fluence was
recorded into the test log. If the processor was still functional after the error, and the test program was still
capable of being restarted, the program continued and the ion beam was applied again until the next error.
After all test programs were run for both configurations of the L 1-cache, the test chamber was vented and a
new test device was installed. The same procedures were repeated for all test devices. Next, the ion beam
was changed, and the same procedures were repeated until all devices hao been tested under all three
beams. This sequence is summarized in a flowchart in Fig. 9.
In summary, the test variables were:
g 3 Heavy-ion beams: Xenon, Krypton, Argon
£7 4 Test devices: two microprocessors from each vendor
£1 2 Ll-cache configurations: enabled versus disabled
3 Test programs: REGTEST, ALUTEST, and MCPDIAG
{:3 Indirect variables: device temperature, vacuum pressure, and power supply voltages &
currents
2O
INSTALLTEST SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL
CHECK-OUT
DEPRESSURIZE
TEST CHAMBER
BEAM CALIBRATION
& DIAGNOSTICS
LOAD & BEGIN
TEST PROGRAM
START B EAIVl
YES
I
_°___
PROGRAMCHANGE
PART
,i CHANGE
' I BEAMl CHANGE
L
I
ERROR HANDLING
AND LOGGING
_f _ST
COMPLETED
Figure 9: The Test Procedure flowchart for the 486-DX4 SEE test. The last three action
blocks are not fully decomposed.
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6.0 TEST RESULTS
6.1 Overview
The SEU testing took place on two separate dates, September 19 and November 26, 1996. Two beams,
Xenon and Krypton, were run on the first date, and Argon was run on the latter date. A total of six
microprocessor parts were tested producing a total of 234 data runs. The processors from AMD were
tested a total of 88 times, and those from Intel a total of 146 times.
On average, each processor was tested about 23 times per beam. However, the first AMD part tested
under Xenon experienced instantaneous latchup, and after only four data runs it was decided to forego
further testing, and proceed to test the first Intel part, which were more successful. Table 3 breaks down
the number of tests run on each part per beam.
Two parts from lntel were used in the experiment, and are denoted as Inlel-1 and Inlel-2. Four parts from
AMD were tested, and are referred to as AMD-1 through AMD-4. Before testing with Argon, AMD-1 and
AMD-2 were suspect of being permanently damaged by latchup, and were replaced with two identical parts,
AMD-3 and AMD-4.
The complete test data log is given in Appendix B. It contains the test conditions, data parameters, failure
signatures, and cross-sections obtained for each data run. Using this log, the raw test data was processed
and analyzed to investigate the following issues:
(1) the observed error modes
(2) dependency on cache configuration
(3) dependency on the test program used
(4) comparison of performance between lntel and AMD
(5) upset cross-sections for each error mode
(6) SEU thresholds and saturated error rates
(7) SEL thresholds and behavior
Table 3: A breakdown of the number of tests run on each part per beam.
Test Processor
i
i
AMD-1
AMP-2
Xenon
i
4
i
j Krypt0n [ Argon,
II ll/a
0 22 n/a'
i
AMD-3 n/a n/a 26
AMD-4 n/a n/a 25
' " "' 24_ 'Intel,1 28 22
Intel.2 22 26 24
6.2 Observed Error Modes
The first step in analyzing the data was to identify a consistent set of error modes based on the failure
signatures of each data run. Eight error modes were identified, and each data run was categorized into one
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of these modes. The eight error modes are presented in Table 4. In a few instances, two or more error
modes could be identified for a particular data run, such as if a system error was detected right before a
reboot occurred. In the following subsections, the details of each error mode are discussed and particular
test cases are highlighted to help corroborate the 486-DX4's SEE behavior.
Table 4: The eight SEE error modes identified for the 486-DX4 microprocessor.
OBSERVED
ERROR MODE
SEU
DATA ERROR
PROGRAM FLOW
ERROR
PROGRAM HANG
FPU FAll'.
SYSTEM ERROR
REBOOT
LATCHUP
DESCRIPTION
SEU errors explicitly detected in the application register set by the
REGTEST program. The error reporting subroutines were invoked
and the erroneous word/byte in the affected re_ister was reported
Errors detected in a data variable that did not cause a disruption in the
_o_ flow
Errors that caused an abnormal flow in the program path, but did not
cause the prod:ram to hanl_
Errors that caused the test program to crash and the processor to quit
respondin_ to further inputs; a manual reboot was required
An SEU error in the floating-point unit that was explicitly detected by
the MCPDIAG program
An upset that halted the processor due to a system-level error. System
recovery was not possible; examples are internal stack overflow, divide
by zero, memory allocation error, etc.
SEUs that caused the processor to initiate a system reboot
Upsets that caused a latchup condition and was detected by a sudden
increase in the power supply current
Proeram Hanes
Program hangs were observed on all test processors and test programs, and they were the most frequent
errormode encountered. When a program hang was detected, the test program stopped executing and the
entire system usually quit responding to further inputs. In nine times out of ten, the system had to be
manually reset, but in a few cases a "CTRL-C" would allow the system to break to the C:\ prompt and the
system still appeared to be functional. A manual reset was always performed to re-initialize the processor
for the next test.
Whenever a program hang occurred, a "warm" reset was performed first as opposed to recycling the power
with a "cold" reset. This warm reset was to help eliminate the possibility of an SEL condition. If SEL had
occurred, the warm reset would not clear the latch and the subsequent reboot would fail. If this was the
case, the power was recycled and the data run was classified as a latchup.
The error that caused the program hang couldhave manifested itself in a multitude of ways. If the program
stack or instruction pointer (EIP register) was upset, the processor would lose track of the next instruction
to execute and most likely attempt to process an invalid opcode. Another program hang scenario could
occur if a memory address, either a segment value or an offset, was upset. The contents of the corrupted
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address may generate a number of exceptions or illegal accesses that could fail the processor. Another
scenario could occur if an arithmetic or logic operand was upset, thus producing an erroneous result that
halts the processor. Approximately 50% of the program hangs occurred with the internal L 1-cache enabled
and 50°h with it disabled.
Latchups
The latchup error mode is defined as an upset caused by SEL, and was detected by the maximum current
limit being exceeded on the power supply. The latchups were defined as either "'soft," when the current
slowly rose to the limit, or "'hard," as when the current quickly jumped to the limit and the test program
halted and the video monitor dimmed (due to excess current drain from the video card). Immediately after
detecting a latchup, the power supplies were turned off and the beam stopped. Approximately two minutes
were allowed until the power was turned back on.
As noted earlier, the first AMD part did not perform well under Xenon. Out of the four data runs taken, all
were hard latchups that occurred within four seconds. Due to time comtraints, the second AMD part was
not tested under Xenon. Both AMD parts were tested under Krypton, and together they experienced
latchups 47% of the time. With Argon, the AMD parts experienced latchups about 14% of the time.
The Intel parts faired much beaer against latchups, with only one latchup being detected on part Inlel-2
under Xenon. No other latchups were detected on lntel's parts, and no permanent damage was observed.
SEU Errors
The SEU error mode could only be detected when the REGTEST program was being executed. A test was
assigned this error mode when a miscompare was detected in one of the shaded registers of Fig. 2 (section
3.0). This detection would have occurred in the error-handling routine after the register failed the second
compare against the test pattern. The register and byte location of the SEU was reported on the video
monitor. Most of the time this upset was isolated to a single byte, but multiple upsets were detected in the
same register in 40% of the SEU error cases. After one SEU, the program would resume checking all
registers until the next error was detected.
A total of 38 SEU errors were detected out of all 234 data runs, and out of these only 9 occurred when the
Ll-cache was enabled, and 29 occurred with it disabled. No correlation between the upset rate and the test
patterns could be determined from the data, that is no evidence exists to prove that writing all l's or all O's
is more susceptible than the other. A breakdown of the percentage of SEUs detected for each register is
given in Table 5. The data combines the errors across all beams for each vendor, and is a percentage of the
total SEUs detected for each vendor.
In some executions of the REGTEST program, the instruction that contained the test pattern used to check
the register contents was also upset. The test pattern value was a constant coded into the instruction, and it
was sometimes upset during its residency on the chip. When the compare instruction was executed, a
presumably good register was compared to a bad test pattern and a mismatch was flagged. The error-
handling routine helped distinguish between true SEUs and bad test patterns by re-comparing the register in
the error-handling routine. If this time the result was equal (hence compared by a different, good
instruction) it was assumed that the register was not corrupted. This condition was then classified as a data
error, described in the next subsection.
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Table 5: The distribution of the 38 SEU errors detected in the 486-DX4's application register
set for all beams. The errors were detected by the REGTEST program.
Percentage of SEUs detected in each register
I
Register AMD INTEL
EAX
EBX
10% 17.80 %
10% 7.I4%
ECX 20 % 7.14 %
EDX 10 % 17.80 %
ESI 0 % 17.80 %
EDI 20 % 21.40 %
EBP 20 % 3.57 %
ES 10 % 0.00 %
FS 0 % 7.14 %'
GS 0 % 0.00 %
Data Errors
A data error was defined as an upset in a data variable that was detected by erroneous output on the video
monitor. The kinds of upsets were usually single, isolated errors, such as a wrong character being
displayed, and did not cause a disruption in the program flow. One example of this type of error was the
display of an incorrect loop iteration number, such as "loop iteration: 1&3" where the '&' was the upset
location. Another example was the output message: "time: 00:00" being upset to: "time: 0d:00." In another
case, only half of an output message was printed, probably due to an index pointer being upset. Some
errors had an operational impact to the program, such as the case when an upset caused a loop delay
variable to be changed to a higher value and effectively increased the delay time. In another test case,
the maximum loop counter was upset from 256 to 400, thus extra loop iterations were performed.
Out of the 18 data errors detected, 16 occurred when the Ll-cache was enabled. Most of these errors were
due to an upset in an instruction or data variable that was stored in the cache, and the upset generally
occurred before the instruction was processed. When the Ll-cache was disabled all instructions and data
(except in registers) resided in system DRAM, thus being somewhat protected from upsets.
Program-Flow Errors
A program-flow error was.similar to a data error, except that the upset caused an abnormal flow in the
program path such that proper execution could not continue. It differs from a program hang in that the
processor did not crash. An example of a program-flow error is when the normal output on the video
monitor was interrupted by stray ASCII characters. The processor continued to operate, but no meaningful
program data was seen and a system reboot was required. In another test case, every other line of the
program output contained erroneous spaces that were mixed in with the good program output.
Eighteen program-flow errors were detected and all but 2 occurred with the Ll-cache enabled. As with the
case of data errors, the cause of the error was presumably an instruction or data variable being upset in the
cache or instruction pipeline, but the location and nature of these upsets were such that the program-flow
was adversely affected.
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System Errors and Processor Reboots
A system error was a type of upset that caused a system-level error to occur, which always caused the test
program to abort and usually halted the processor. There were some cases where a "CTRL-C" input
would break the system back to the C:\ prompt, but a warm boot was still always performed. The
offending system error message was displayed on the video monitor, and a list of all the messages observed
follows:
• DIVIDE OVERFLOW
• NO ROM BASIC: SYSTEM HALTED
• MEMORY ALLOCATION ERROR: SYSTEM HALTED
• INTERNAL STACK OVERFLOW: SYSTEM HALTED
• SECTOR NOT FOUND WRITING DRIVE C:\ A/R/I/F
• CANNOT ALLOCATE COMMAND.COM: SYSTEM HALTED
A reboot error was a special case of a system error in that it caused the microprocessor to initiate a self-
reboot. Twelve system errors were detected, 9 with the cache enabled and 3 with it disabled. Five reboot
errors were observed; only l with the cache on and 4 with it off.
Fioatim,-Point Unit Errors
A FPU fail error is an upset that is explicitly detected in the floating-point unit by the MCPDIAG test
program. If the program flags a certain FPU test as "failed," the data run was classified as an FPU fail.
While the upset was actually detected in the FPU, it may have originated elsewhere and propagated into the
FPU. Seven FPU errors were detected, with 2 occurring when the cache was enabled, and 5 when it was
disabled.
Processing the ALUTEST output files
When an ALU'IEST completed normally, the experimenter immediately halted the beam and the fluence
was recorded. The term "normal termination" was entered in the test log. While the execution and
termination of the program escaped any observable errors, it was not known if the output data files had
been corrupted.
To determine if errors had occurred, an analysis program was written to compare each data file to an
appropriate control file. These control files were generated by running ALUTEST in the absence of
radiation and thus their results are error-free. The analysis program fwst opens both fries and begins
comparing the data, line by line, to the control file. If a mismatch was detected, the line numbers and
mismatched data were written to another output file. After the entire file had been processed, the output
file was then reviewed to see if and where any errors occurred, and what type of error mode was present.
To process the newly discovered upset, the byte location of the error in the data file was found, and using
the total number of bytes in the file and the total fluence at program termination, interpolation was used to
determine the fluence at the location of the error. This data was then amended to the test data log.
While the majority of ALUTEST executions resulted in program hangs, 20 executions produced "normally
terminated" data files, and out of those, only 7 contained errors. From these 7 data runs, the only errors
found were program flow errors and data errors.
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6.3 The Error Mode Distribution
The distribution of error modes was almost identical for all devices of the same vendor, that is all AMD
devices and all Intel devices exhibited nearly the same behavior for each beam. This indicates that the test
devices were all good representa0ve samples of each vendor's design.
For all test devices, the most common error mode observed was program hangs, however AMD exhibited a
strong tendency for latchup, especially at the higher LET values. The combined error mode distribution for
each vendor is presented in Table 6, and graphically in Figs. 10 and 11. It is important to note that the
number of tests run on each processor was not the same, thus the percentages cannot be directly compared
from one vendor to the other.
Table 6:
Error Mode
SEU
The distribution of error mode percentages for each vendor over all three beams.
mr
14.8
Distribution of Error Modes (in %)
INTEL AMD
gr
18.2
12.7
7.3
50.9
1.8
7.3
1.8
0.0
Xe Ar
17.3 15.2
3.8 6.8
11.5 6.8
55.8 45.8
1.9 3.4
5.8 5.1
1.9 3.4
1.9 13.6
X_Kr
2.9
0.0
2.9
41.2
2.9
2.9
0.0
47.1
0.0
data error 7.4 0.0
pgm/low err 3.7 0.0
pgm hang 68.5 0.0
FPU fail 3.7 0.0
system error 0.0 0.0
reboot 1.8 0.0
i
latchup 0.0 100.0
Z7
Error Modes as • Function of Ion Spedes
for INTEL devices
latchup" II
reboot" t
System errors"
_" FPU fail i_l
._ I_m hang
pgm flow errors"
data errors"
SEU
• Xenon
n Krypton
B Argon
............. ;J .............. I ............. Y ............................ I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Error Percentage (%)
Figure 10: The error distribution percentages for all Intel data runs.
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Figure 11" The error distribution percentages for all AMD data runs.
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6.4 Calculating the Upset Cross-Section
The next major effort in analyzing the SEE test data was to compute the cross-sections for each error
mode. These cross-sections represent the statistical susceptibility of each error mode to upsets, and can be
related to upset rate. The cross-section is defined by: a = (# of errors)/(total fluence), and is usually
expressed in units of cm2/device. The number of errors was usually one, but in some cases multiple upsets
occurred and this number was higher. For the cross-section calculations, the total fluence is the total
number of particles that a particular device was exposed to up to thefirst occurrence of each unique error.
For example, if the first data error occurred on run #9, the total fluence for this particular error would be
the sum of fluences for run numbers 1-9. After the first occurrence, the total fluence is then the number of
particles between each subsequent occurrence of that error mode. By performing this analysis, the results
give a representation of the device's susceptibility to each error mode. This could shed some light as to
which error mode is more likely to occur in a particular operating configuration, or which aspect of the
processor is more vulnerable to radiation.
6.4.1 Error Mode Cross-Sections
To calculate the error mode cross-sections, the first step was to group all the occurrences of each error
mode in sequential order for each processor, and for each beam. Thus up to eight groups (the total number
of error modes) could be generated for each test processor. This procedure was performed separately for
each test device and for each beam.
After these groups are compiled, the total fluence is found for each error as described above. It is
important to get the total number of particles between each unique error in a given error mode, became
statistically, this is the number of particles the device "survived" before experiencing an upset of this type.
When the total fluence is calculated for each error instance, the cross-section is obtained by dividing the
number of errors (again usually one), by this total, summed fluence.
It should be noted that two of the error modes were program dependent, and could only be detected when
certain test programs were executed. The SEU error mode could only be detected when the REGTEST
program was running, and the FPU fail mode could only be detected when the MCPDIAG test program
was running. When calculating the cross-sections for each of these errors, only the data runs that executed
these programs can be counted in summing the total fluence.
An example of this cross-section analysis can be found below in Table 7. The data comes from device
Intel-1 that was obtained under Xenon, and it shows the cross-section and total fluence values for the SEU
and data error modes. Consult the test data log in Appendix B, and look for the first three SEU errors for
this part, and compute the fluence between each SEU error.
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Table 7: A partial list of the cross-section data points for Intel-1 under Xenon.
Partial SEU & Data Error Cross.Section Calculations for Intel-1 (under Xenon)
Error
Mode
SEU
DATA
ERROR
# Program
Type
1 FREG
2 5REG
3 FREG
4 FREG
5 AREG
Run
#
9
12
25
6
14
Total Run #s for
cumulative
fluence
6-9
10-12
13-16,24-25a
6
7-14
Total
cumulative
fluence
10,170
2,942
12,250
1,000
12,552
Cross-section
9.83 E-5
3.40 E-4
8.16 E-5
1.00 E-3
7.97 E-5
LI
cache
config.
on
on
on
on
on
Plotting Cross-Section versus LET Curves
After the upset cross-sections were calculated for all devices & beams, plots were made of the cross-section
versus LET for each device. These plots represent the upset rates for the device at each LET value, and
can be used for comparison to other devices. The combined plots for each vendor are shown below in Figs.
12 & 13. The LET values of the three beams again are: Xenon = 43.1, Krypton = 25.1, and Argon = 7.7
MeV cm2/mg. Note that the x-coordinate values have been expanded around each LET value in order to
allow an easier interpretation of the graph's legend. Several data labels in the legend are repeated due to
the limitation with the graphing tool, but the top entry in each legend corresponds to the leftmost column of
data for each beam, and proceeds down to the last graph legend corresponding to the rightmost data
column.
From the cross-section plots, it can be seen that the variance within each data set is rather large; about one
order of magnitude from the mean. The variance tends to become tighter as the LET increases. Also, the
distribution within each error mode is fairly widespread. This may be attributed to the fact that the 486-
DX4 is such a complex device, that there are a number of ways in which it could be upset for a particular
error mode.
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Figure 12: A combined plot of the upset cross-section versus LET for all Intel devices. Note that the
LET values are: Xe=43,1, Kr=25.1, and Ar=7.7 MeV cm2/mg, and that the x-axis has been expanded
around each LET value to allow easier interpretation of the graph's legend.
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Figure 13: A combined plot of the upset cross-section versus LET for all AMD devices. Note that the
LET values are: Xe=43.1, Kr=25,1, and Ar=7.7 MeV cm2/mg, and that the x-axis has been expanded
around each LET value to allow easier interpretation of the graph's legend.
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6.4.2 Cache Dependency
It has already been shown that the 486-DX4 experiences a higher upset rate when the Ll-cache is enabled.
This is because program code and data reside onboard the processor, and are thus vulnerable to radiation
upsets even before they are executed. The data used in the error mode upset cross-sectJom developed in the
previous section has also been plotted to reflect the Ll-cache configuration for each error. This
information is given in Figs. 14 and 15, where the '+' represents an error while the cache was enabled, and
an 'o' while the cache was disabled. From these plots, it is clear to see that higher SEU rates occur when
the Ll-cache is enabled versus disabled, by at least one order of magrdtude.
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6.4.3 Test Program Dependency
An investigation was made to determine if a clear dependency could be made between the upset rate and
test programs that were used. By plotting the cross-section data in terms of which program was executed
during each error, the results indicate that no consistent grouping could be made between the data points,
thus no strong dependency on the test program versus the upset error rate could be made.
6.4.4 Log-Mean Average Cross-sections
In order to reduce the data to a more manageable form, the log-mean average was taken for each set of data
to yield a statistical representation of the upset cross-section. Since there is such a wide difference between
each cache configuration, the log-mean average was performed on each cache configuration for each beam.
This was taken for all error modes for each beam with LI enabled, and again for L1 disabled. This
sequence was repeated for all devices and beams, and the log-mean average cross-sections are listed in
Table 8. The data from this table was used to generate the log-mean average plots found in Figs. 16 and
17. A curve is fitted through the data points to get a better representation of the SEU behavior of the 486-
DX4.
Table 8: The log-mean average upset cross-sections for each vendor. All the error modes
have been combined for each cache configuration, beam, & device.
LOG-MEAN AVERAGE CROSS-SECTION DATA
Vendor
AMD
INTEL
Xenon
L1 on L1 off
n/a nla
2.9E-4 3.2E-5
Krypton
LI on LI off
1.4E-3 2.0E-3
1.3E-4 1.0E-5
L1 on
5.7E-5
3.9E-5
Argon
L1 off
8.2E-6
2.5E-7
6.4.5 Estimating the SEU Threshold and Saturated Cross-Section
The log-mean average data in Figs. 16 and 17 was used to estimate the SEU threshold. From the fined
data points, the SEU threshold for lntel appears to be $.0 +1.$ MeV..em2/mg, and for AMD the SEU
threshold appears to be 3.0 +1.$ MeV-cm2/mg. The plus and minus terms take into effect that the actual
thresholds will be slightly lower when the Ll-cache is enabled and slightly higher when it is disabled.
The saturated cross-section region can be determined by looking at where the slope of the curves go to
zero. For Intel parts, these curves go to zero around 3.0E-4 cm2/device when the cache is on, around
3.2E-5 cm-'/device when it is off. The saturated cross-sections for AMD tend to converge around
2.5E-3 cm2/device, and this is probably due to the limiting factor being latchups at the higher LETs,
regardless of the cache configuration.
From the experimental observations, AMD appears to have a SEL threshold of approximately 5.0 :[:1.5
MeV-cm"/mg, and for lntel it appears to be much higher, around 40.0 MeV-cm2/mg.
In comparison to this research, the SEE test results on other related 80x86 devices obtained by different
institutions are similar to those found here. JPL [271 tested the 80386 microprocessor and determined the
SEU threshold LET (with heavy ions) to be 3.5 :t: 1 MeV-cm2/mg, and the SEL threshold to he 40 MeV-
cm'_/mg. Goddard [29] tested the 486-DX2 and reported the SEU threshold LET to he around 5-6 MeV-
cm"/mg, and the SEL threshold to be around 59.6 MeV-cm2/mg.
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Figure 16: The log-mean average cross-section data for all Intel parts. Each point in the
graph is the log-mean average of all error modes combined in each beam set, and for each
cache configuration.
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7.0 SPACEFLIGHT PREDICTIONS FOR THE 486-DX4
In order to provide an upset rate estimate and mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) prediction for the 486-
DX4 operating in a space environment, a software program called "HIZ" was used. The algorithm
combines experimental test results, device geometry, and environmental parameters of interest to compute
an integrated, numerical estimation of the device's SEU rate, and is based on the methods similar to
Chenette [2]. The orbital parameters used to compute these predictions were characteristic of the
International Space Station environment; 51.6 ° inclination and 270 nm altitude. The HIZ program was
used under the direction of Dr. Pat O'Neill at NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas [15].
The key environmental inputs to HIZ were to compute the predictions at a solar minimum, to include
galactic cosmic rays & heavy-ions, and to include solar flares. Next, the upset cross-section data obtained
from the SEU testing was entered, as well as some additional 486-DX4 device information. HIZ assumes
that each measured upset cross-section point is a step function and is equal to zero below the threshold.
The algorithm takes each data point and integrates the upset cross-section over the given LET range, to
produce error rates and MTBF predictions due to the contribution of that LET value. As each data point is
processed, the new error rates and MTBF are integrated with the previous values.
The output of HIZ gives the error rate contribution at each LET value, the accumulated error rate, the total
dose rate, and the MTBF for the device in terms of number of clays until failure. The overall results from
HIZ are summarized in Table 9, which presents the expected MTBF for each vendor, in each LI-cache
configuration, and for two different shielding arrangements. The first shielding assumed 100 mils of
aluminum, and the second used the shielding distribution found inside the Space Shuttle Orbiter. The
shielding inside the Orbiter is much greater than 100 mils of aluminum, and it increases the MTBF by
almost an order of magnitude. There is a vast difference between the results, especially between vendors,
and this may be attributed to the high latchup susceptibility of AMD, as well as the smaller number of
overall AMD data samples taken.
Table 9: The HIZ program results that predict the estimated SEU rate of the
486-DX4 in the International Space Station environment.
MTBF PREDICTIONS FOR THE 486-DX4 IN A SPACE STATION ORBIT
inclination: 51.6 degrees / altitude: 270 nmi
Shielding INTEL
100 m|l (AL)
Inside Orbiter
AMD
LI on 1,1 off L1 on L1 off
4,150 days 333,039 days 377 days 282 days
32,404 days 971,147 clays 4,181 clays 3,197 days
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS
In this research, the importance of the 486-DX4 was addressed, and motivation was given to pursue SEE
testing. A cyclotron-based experiment was devised and three heavy-ion sources were used to determine the
SEE thresholds and saturation levels. All test goals were achieved and the major objectives were met. The
results from this 486-DX4 experiment also agree with trends from previous 80x86 microprocessor SEU
testing. From the experimental observations and of the analysis performed, the following conclusions can
be drawn:
(1) The 486-DX4 is a very complex device that has many sensitive areas and many possible mechanisms
in which a particle can cause an upset. The large variance in the data gives upper and lower bounds on the
operational performance for different workloads, L 1-cache configurations, and temporal spatial activity.
The eight error modes identified represent some of the mechanisms in which an error is detected at the user
level.
(2) The L1 internal cache plays a large role in determining the susceptibility of the 486-DX4, for there is
over a magnitude of difference in the upset cross sections between cache configurations. When the cache is
enabled, program hangs, data errors, and program flow errors can be frequently expected as code and data
are vulnerable and easily upset in the cache. One possible recommendation for operation in the space
environment would be to disable the Ll-cache during intense periods of solar activity or when traversing
the South Atlantic Anomaly (if the reduction in performance can be accepted).
(3) No distinct program-dependent relationship could be found on SEU rate.
(4) A significant difference in vendor performance was observed, with AMD exhibiting a much higher
susceptibility to SEE as compared to Intel. In terms of latchup, AMD experienced SEL at all three LETs,
and its SEU and SEL thresholds appear to be very close together. The reason for this could lie in AMD's
fabrication process and smaller feature sizes.
(5) From the test data obtained in this research, the estimated SEU and SEL thresholds are:
Estimated Threshold INTEL AMD
IMeV-cm'/m_l
SEU 5.0 +1.5 3.0 +1.5
SEL 40.0 5.0 +__1.5
(6) The HIZ program was used to predict the MTBF for the 486-DX4 in the International Space
Station environment. The results for both vendors indicated that there was over a ten-fold increase in
MTBF when operating with the internal Ll-cache disabled.
In the radiation testing community, it is common to classify newly tested parts for SEE into one of four
categories. Category 1 recommends the part for all spaceflight operations. Category 2 recommends the
part for spaceflight, but some SEE mitigation techniques may be required. Category 3 states the part
is recommended for some operations, but extensive SEE preventative and recovery teclimques are required,
and Category 4 does not recommend the part for any spaceflight operations. For the 486-DX4, it appears
that Intel may be placed in Category 3, and AMD placed in Category 4.
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In conclusion, ground-based SEE testing is a valuable and necessary requirement for the complex digital
devices used in highly-reliable systems. If current industry trends prevail, SEUs will continue to remain a
viable threat to future digital systems as long as the device's size,, weight, volume, cost and power are
reduced, and the device's performance, density and complexity are increased. As highly-reliable systems
become more complex, traditional design evaluation & validation techniques that rely on experience anti
prior knowledge become impractical. It is therefore imperative to obtain accurate upset rates and behavior
data at both the component level and the system level. Using a cyclotron as a fault-injection source
provides a realistic means of simulating a critical part of the space environment, and at a fraction of the
cost of an actual spaceflight.
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,APPENDIX A.- GLOSSARY
ALU arithmetic logic unit
AMD - Advanced Micro Devices
Ar - Argon
ASICS - application-specific integrated circuits
CPU - central processing unit
cross-section - a statistical measure of a device's upset rate determined by the total fluence
and number of upsets.
data run - one execution of a test program under radiation to generate a data point
DRAM - dynamic random access memory
eV - electron-Volt
flux - number of particles/cm 2 per second per device
fluence - total number of particles/cm 2 per device; the integral of flux over time
FPU - floating-point unit
GPC - general purpose computers (aboard the space shuttle)
HDD hard disk drive
IC integrated circuit
I/O input/output
JSC Johnson Space Center
latchup a form of permanent circuit damage associated with a single event effect
LET linear energy transfer; the rate that energy is deposited into a material per unit
length
KB Kilobyte (thousand bytes)
Kr Krypton
LEO low earth orbit
MB - Megabyte (million bytes)
NASA - National Aeronautics & Space Administration
run nautical mile
ns - nano-second
PC - personal computer
PGA - pin grid array
SAA - South Atlantic Anomaly
SEE - single event effects
SEL - single event latchup
SEU - single event upset
TAMU - Texas A&M University
TCS - Test Control Station
Xe - Xenon
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APPENDIX B - TEST DATA SHEETS
(see a_ached)
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APPENDIX C - TEST SOFTWARE SOURCE CODE
The complete source code may be obtained by contacting the author:
Coy Kouba
Avionic Systems Division \ EV211
NASA - Johnson Space Center
Houston, TX 77058
(281) 483-8069
CKouba @ ems.jsc.nasa.gov
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APPENDIX D - THE SPACE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
The space radiation environment is a very hostile and dangerous place, especially for spacecraft electronics.
The environment consists of a diverse suite of radiation particles with energies ranging from the kilo
electron-volts I (KeV) to GeV and greater. These particles are either trapped in the Earth's magnetic field
or are transiting the solar system through Earth's domain [25]. The transiting radiation is comprised of a
solar contribution and a galactic contribution. As reported in Holmes-Sielde [9], the three main compon-
ents of the space radiation environment are:
1. Trapped radiation: a very broad spectrum of energetic charged particles trapped in the Earth's
magnetosphere (which includes the magnetic fields and radiation belts).
2. Cosmic rays: energetic heavy-ions of low concentration (called flux) that includes all ions in the
periodic table with energies exceeding the TeV range.
3. Solar flares: intense solar eruptions that emit energetic protons with energies up to several hundred
MeV, and includes small amounts of alpha particles, heavy-ions, and electrons.
Also found throughout space is a continuous plasma of electrons and protons with energies up to 100 KeV
at high fluxes (up to lxl0 _2cm2s'l). Within the Earth's radiation belts, these particles are seen as the low-
energy population of trapped particles, and at the fringe of the magnetosphere they are associated with the
solar wind and are found in high flux concentrations. The magnetosphere constitutes that region surroun-
ding the Earth which is influenced by the magnetic field.
The Cosmic Radiation Environment
A major contribution of the transiting radiation comes from cosmic rays, and they originate from three
sources: galactic, solar, and terrestrial. Galactic cosmic rays originate outside the solar system but are
associated with the galaxy. These rays are detected in a fairly continuous low flux concentration and are
referred to as the space "background radiation." Their composition is about 85% protons, 14% alpha
particles, and 1% heavier nuclei [25]. As reported in Sexton [24], it is the heavy-ion contribution of the
galactic cosmic rays that are most harmful to spacecraft electronics. In Fig. D1, a breakdown is given of
the heavy-ion portion of the galactic cosmic ray spectrum. As can be seen from the graph, the flux is
minimal for those particles with an atomic number greater than 30. At a distance of one AU from the sun 2
and outside the Earth's magnetosphere, the cosmic ray flux is approximately four particles per era: per
second [25].
Terrestrial cosmic rays are those galactic and solar cosmic rays which penetrate and interact with the
Earth's atmosphere and are transformed into secondary radiation. These rays constitute the majority of
cosmic radiation experienced at the Earth's surface (i.e.. UV radiation), and can still be a threat to
integrated circuits; there have been rare cases observed of single event upsets occurring to Space
Shuttle computers while the vehicle was still on the launch pad!
zOne eV is the energy gained by one electron in aceeleratmg through a potential difference of one volt.
1 eV = 1.6x10 "t9Joules.
2 One Astronomical Unit (AU) is the distance from the Sun to the Earth; approximately 93,000,000 miles.
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Figure DI" The heavy-ion components of the Galactic Cosmic Ray particle spectrum [24].
The Solar Contribution
Solar cosmic rays are direct products of the sun, and are regulated by changes in solar activity. The sun
normally emits protons, neutrons, X-rays, alpha particles, ultra-violet rays and gamma rays. Much of this
material is carried away from the sun and into Earth orbit by the solar wind. While the solar wind is
generally comprised of low energy particles, they are major contributors to the total overall cosmic ray
flux, and it acts as the "driver" for the transiting radiation experienced near Earth. During periods of solar
maximum, the increased solar wind tends to dilute the more energetic galactic cosmic rays from the Earth,
while at solar minimum, the galactic contribution is more prevalent.
Solar activity varies in approximately eleven year cycles. During periods of increased activity, violent
eruptions associated with sun spots occur and are called "solar flares." These solar flares emit a heavy
concentration of energetic protons, as well as smaller amounts of alpha particles, electrons, and heavy-ions
[9]. Intense solar flares can last several days and can increase the normal cosmic radiation flux by several
orders of magnitude. Fig. D2 illustrates the change in proton fluences observed over three solar
cycles. The solar flare protons are usually soft protons and do not directly cause damage to integrated
circuits, but they can interact with other materials (i.e., spacecraft or IC packaging) to produce secondary
radiation, including the more penetrating bremsstrahlung radiation and neutrons [9].
The solar flare heavy-ions normally consist of the helium ion (in 5-10% total concentrations), with heavier
ions representing an even smaller population (below the level found in the background radiation).
Earth's Radiation Environment
The Earth's natural radiation environment is closely correlated to its magnetic field, which is a dipole
consisting of north and south poles with closed field lines. The magnetic dipole is offset from the
Earth's axis of rotation by eleven degrees and is displaced some 500 km toward the Western Pacific [25].
The magnetic field is not symmetrical and is distorted by geological features on Earth and also by the sun.
The magnetosphere is shaped and molded in large part by the solar wind, producing a hemispherical shape
on the sun side, and a cylindrical shape on the night side [9]. Refer to Fig. D3 for a depiction of the
magnetosphere and the Earth's radiation belts.
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Figure D2: The solar flare proton activity over three cycles [9].
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Figure D3: The composition of Earth's magnetosphere and radiation belts [9].
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Within the Earth's magnetic field and above the dense atmosphere, trapped electrons, protons, and sparse
amounts of low-energy heavy-ions are found. The main particle trapping region of interest is called the
plasmasphere, as depicted in Fig. D3. As reported by Stassinopoulos [25], "these particles gyrate around
and bounce along magnetic field lines, and are reflected back and forth between pairs of conjugate mirror
points in opposite hemispheres." Due to their charge, electrons drift eastward around the Earth, while
protons and heavy-ions drift westward. Fig. D4 illustrates this behavior. Besides trapped particles,
transiting cosmic rays of solar or galactic origin are also encountered in the magnetosphere.
mirror point
magnetic field line
drift of ons
Figure D4: The movement of trapped particles in the Earth's magnetosphere [25].
The Earth's radiation environment is a complex function of both place and time, as certain regions of the
magnetosphere possess different trapping abilities. The trapped electron profile consists of two distinct
zones, with the inner zone extending to about 2.4 Earth radii (Re), and the outer zone from 2.8 to 12.0 Re
[9]. The area in between these two zones is commonly referred to as the slot. The trapped electrons have
energies up to 7 MeV with the most energetic particles found in the outer zone.
In comparison, the profde of the trapped protons exhibits a maximum flux at about 1.75 (Re). At this point
forward the flux decreases proportionally with increasing distance, and subsides around 3.8 Re [9]. The
trapped protons have energies up to several hundred MeV, with the more energetic ones occurring at lower
altitudes.
The South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) is a particular region of the magnetosphere that is depressed inward
towards the Earth due to the tilt of its magnetic axis relative to its rotational axis. This depression
lowers the shielding protection and allows more trapped radiation to be encountered over the South
Atlantic. The SAA is responsible for most of the intense and penetra0ng trapped radiation in low-earth
orbit (LEO), thus a higher number of single event upsets (SEUs) can be expected in this region. Flight data
from the Space Shut0e's general purpose computers (GPCs) supports this claim as Fig. D5 shows. Each
dot in the figure represents a single SEU hit, and each triangle represents a multiple SEU hit. Note the
increased number of upsets inside the SAA as wed as at the higher inclinations. Flight data also supports
the dependence of altitude on the SEU rate. As Fig. D6 suggests, more upsets are observed at higher
altitudes as opposed to the lower ones shown in the previous figure.
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The magnetosphere offers some protection to transiting radiation in the form of "geomagnetic shielding."
This occurs when the moving charged particles are deflected by the Earth's magnetic field. These
deflections occur perpendicular to the field lines, thus at low altitudes and latitudes (up to 45 degrees)
cosmic rays are easily repelled. At polar inclinations however, the field lines converge and geomagnetic
shielding is greatly reduced. A particle's penetrating ability is determined by its momentum and
charge, thus heavier and faster particles can penetrate further into the magnetosphere.
Spacecraft computer systems may be afforded more protection by shielding the sensitive components
against radiation. Low-energy particles can easily be stopped with thin shielding, but high-energy ones are
more threatening. As high-energy particles such as solar flare protons impact with a material (such as the
spacecraft or IC packaging) the particles can undergo a transformation into secondary radiation, such as
highly penetrating bremsstrahlung and neutrons. As these particles collide with the spacecraft they slow
down, and a continuous spectrum of x-rays are emitted in the direction of penetration [25]. It is this
secondary radiation that can sometimes be more threatening to electronics than the original particle.
In summary, the radiation particles that are most harmful to spacecraft electronics are: protons, electrons,
heavy-ions, alpha particles, and x-rays. The three main sources of space radiation are cosmic rays, solar
flares, and trapped particles in the Earth's magnetosphere. While the magnetosphere offers some degree of
protection to space radiation, higher flux concentrations can be expected in high altitude orbits, high
inclination orbits, the polar regions, and the South Atlantic Anomaly. In low earth orbits, the most intense
and penetrating radiation is encountered in the South Atlantic Anomaly in the form of protons. The
vulnerability of spacecraft electronics to radiation depends on several factors including altitude, orbital
inclination, solar activity, and particle flux. The target parameters depend on its shielding, the size of the
integrated circuit features, and the fabrication technology used in the process.
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APPENDIX E - RADIATION EFFECTS ON SEMICONDUCTORS
Radiation can effect the normal operating behavior of semiconductors in many different ways. For
spaceflight computers and electronics, there are two major types of effects: total dose and single
event effects.
Total dose refers to the long-term accumulation of charge, which breaks down the operating characteristics
of the device. When this happens permanent alterations to the device occur, such as a breakdown in its
voltage versus current relationships, a parametric shift in the device thresholds, and a decrease in transistor
switching speeds to name a few. The total dose accumulation occurs over a long period of time, much
longer than for single event effects, but it is directly related to the flux of the environment.
Single event effects (SEE) occur when a single radiation particle strikes a sensitive junction in an operating
semiconductor and causes a disruption in its logic state. An occurrence of a single event effect on a
semiconductor is often referred to as a "hit." SEE effects may be further classified into three subtypes:
transients, single event upsets (SEUs), and single event latchup (SEL). A transient occurs when a hit is
not latched by the circuitry, and an SEU occurs when the hit is latched and the logic state of the device is
changed. A single event latchup is a form of permanent damage induced by the hit. SEU and SEL will be
discussed in further detail in the following subsection.
It is the SEUs are of most interest to this research, because their impacts to digital devices are generally
more threatening than total dose. Additionally, many of the potential spaceflight applications for the
486-DX4 microprocessor would not be in space long enough for total dose to be much of an issue. Thus,
the remainder of this work primarily focuses only on single event effects in semiconductors.
SEU Circuit Effects
When a high-energy particle strikes a junction in an operating semiconductor, it loses energy as it collides
with the electrons and nuclei in the target material. [25][20][24]. Some of this energy is transformed into a
very dense plasma of electron-hole pairs along the track of the particle and ionization occurs. Since the
junction is biased with an electric field, the electron-hole pairs are separated and a current spike is observed
at the circuit node. This phenomena is illustrated in Fig. El which shows the electric field as the hashed
area of the figure. The ion path through the node distorts the electric field into the substrate to create a
highly conductive "funnel" of electron-hole pairs. The funnel eventually collapses as the free carriers are
collected by the PN junction and equilibrium is reestablished. The aforementioned current spike has two
components, a prompt and a delayed response. The prompt component occurs on the order of 0. ]ns after
the hit and is due to the original depletion and funnel region. The delayed component may last hundreds of
nanoseconds and is due to the carrier diffusion. This current response is depicted in Fig. E2.
In order for an SEU to change a node's logic state, the charge that is deposited in the sensitive region must
be greater than the critical charge required to store information on that node. In other words, the particle
must deposit enough energy to exceed the node's logic threshold.
One commonly used measure for the rate of energy deposited in a material is called the linear energy
transfer (LET). It is also called the mass stopping power, lip dE/dx, or the rate of energy loss per unit
length in a material with density p (in our case silicon). LET is expressed in units of MeV-cm:/mg, and is a
useful quantity since it can correlate the total amount of energy deposited in a material for particles with
different characteristics.
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Figure El: The interaction of a heavy-ion penetrating an active region of an integrated
circuit node [24].
Single event latchup (SEL) may sometimes occur when an energetic panicle strikes a junction with a high
electric field and turns on a parasitic bipolar PNPN structure. The range of the panicle travels deep into
the node and the funnel region extends well into the substrate. Since this funnel region is highly conductive,
a "virtual short" is created which may allow a nearby capacitor to discharge. If sufficient energy is stored
on this capacitor, thus high electric fields are present, the discharge may be fast enough that excessive local
heating occurs at the node and a thermal runaway situation develops. Temperatures may get so hot that the
dielectric melts or the conductive layers evaporate, thus permanently damaging the node [24].
System Impacts of SEUs
When an SEU causes a change in the logic state, a "bit flip" occurs at the upset circuit node [20]. SEUs
are usually non-destructive soft errors and can be corrected by reprogramming the affected location [24].
The impact to the system is either corrupted data or program-flow anomalies, depending upon the location
and nature of the upset. Normally SEUs only affect a single bit, but multiple bit hits from the same particle
can also be expected.
As reported in [14], O'Neill states that SEUs can be more of a threat to system integrity than some
permanent failures. One major reason for this is that they are sometimes very difficult to detect and
analyze due to their temporal and spatial characteristics. For instance, an upset may occur in one location
and propagate to another before it is observed at the system level [14][18]. The location of an upset is
therefore one of the biggest factors in determining the impact to the system; for instance, if an SEU occurs
in an unused memory location of a microprocessor's cache, it will probably never be detected. But if an
SEU occurs in the instruction pointer or in a critical register, the system may undergo a catastrophic failure
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Figure E2: The induced current response observed at the node of an integrated circuit after
an SEU hit [24].
in the worst case (such as the case of a spacecraft's trajeaory parameters being upset during re-ena'y).
The latency time from upset to detection is also mother contributing factor in the difficulty of SEU
analysis. An upset may occur in a dormant register that is not accessed until quite some time later. Thus,
the impact of an SEU to the system depends on the location of the upset, how the corrupted data is handled,
and the latency from upset to detection.
